Educational and Health Impact of Two School Feeding Schemes: Evidence from a Randomized Trial in Rural Burkina Faso
Abstract: We use a prospective randomized trial to assess the impact of two school feeding schemes on educational and health outcomes of children from low income household in northern rural Burkina Faso. The school feeding programs under consideration are school meals where students are provided with lunch each school day, and take home rations which provide students with 10 kg of cereal flour each month, conditional on 90 percent attendance rate. After the program ran for one academic year, we found that both school feeding schemes increased girls enrollment by 6 percent.  While we did not observe any significant impact on raw scores on mathematics, we  observed  that  the  time-adjusted  scores  on  mathematics  improved  slightly  for  girls.   An unexpected lower average attendance was observed.  We argue that this reflects the absence of an active labor market and the fact that households are labor constrained and/or child labor is complementary to adult labor.  We show that the interventions caused attendance to decrease in household who are low in child labor supply while attendance improved for households which have a relatively large child labor supply, consistent with the labor constraints.  This, in turn, explains the mixed impacts on learning outcomes that we observed. Finally, for younger siblings of beneficiaries, aged between 12 and 60 months who were not in school, take home rations have increased weight-for-age by .38 standard deviations and weight-for-height by .33 standard deviations.  In contrast, school meals did not have any significant impact on the nutrition of younger children.


Income Risk and Schooling Decisions in Rural Burkina Faso
Abstract: There is a large literature which explores how negative income shocks impact human capital accumulation (especially education) when financial markets are incomplete and households can neither insure nor borrow to smooth their consumption. The main conclusion is that households in these circumstances allocate child time to more labor and to less schooling. Such ex-post use of child time as a self insurance mechanism translates into lower human capital (lower years of education completed) over time which is detrimental to economic growth. There has been, however, little research on the cumulative effects of (perceived) income uncertainty on child education. The intuition is that households that face more a volatile income stream have greater incentives to build up a buffer stock to insure against unforeseen adverse shocks, and non enrollment can be part of such strategy. This paper fills this gap on the literature which focuses on income shocks and education in developing countries. The empirical work uses data from rural Burkina Faso, an environment where school enrollment rates are low and households face frequent income shocks. Controlling for current economic shocks, household wealth levels and child characteristics, I find that income uncertainty (expressed as income variance) consistently reduces a number of education outcomes, including current enrollment status, education expenditures per child, the number of years of education completed and the probability of having been ever enrolled. The estimation results suggest that income uncertainty might have large welfare costs in terms of human capital.


The Intra-Household Economics of Polygyny: Fertility and Child Health in Rural Mali (with Stefan Klonner)
Abstract: Abstract: Building on anthropological evidence, we develop a model of intra-household decision making on fertility and child survival within the framework of the collective household model. We carry out a test of the implications of this framework with data from Demographic and Health Surveys in rural Mali, where polygyny rates among married women are close to 50 per cent. The econometric tests reject the implications of efficient intrahousehold allocations for junior wives in bigynous households and fail to reject for senior wives in bigynous households as well as for wives in monogamous households. These findings are consistent with existent narrative evidence according to which co-wife rivalry is responsible for resource-consuming struggle and junior wives are the adults with the weakest bargaining position in the household.

Economic Role of Children and the Demand for Wives: Evidence from Burkina Faso (with Nistha Sinha)
Abstract: This paper uses data from rural Burkina Faso to probe the links between the economic contribution of children in low income economies and men’s fertility preference, and to show how men’s demand for children determines the number of wives a man marries. The empirical results indicate that men demand more children in areas where child productivity is high, which in turn induce men to take more than one wife. Conditional on our identification strategy, our findings have three caveats. First, they broaden the analysis of determinants of polygyny, providing some explanation to the variation in number of wives within a relatively homogenous agricultural system where variation in female productivity may be limited. Second, the results show the important role of men in areas where polygyny is practiced. Third, the results imply that policies that provide old age security, discourage child labor or encourage schooling may reduce the occurrence of polygyny.


Gender, Social Norms and Household Production in Burkina Faso (with Zaki Wahhaj)
Using a survey of agricultural households in Burkina Faso, we provide evidence that plots owned by the head of the household are farmed much more intensively than plots, with similar characteristics and planted to the same crops, owned by other household members (of both genders). As in previous studies, this evidence is inconsistent with the assumption of Pareto efficiency in household decisions, but additionally suggests that status within the household rather than gender per se may be the most important factor in determining the allocation of productive resources within the household. We argue that the higher yields achieved by the household head may be explained in terms of social norms that require him to spend the earnings from some farms under his control exclusively on household public goods, as has been observed in the anthropological literature on this region. We provide evidence using expenditures data that, holding everything else constant, household head spend relatively more on household public goods than on their private goods.


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